João Vítor Bonin

Product Security Engineer at SAP Office of the CSO. 8 years at SAP across support, enterprise architecture, and security governance. Currently focused on product security assessments and vulnerability management, while building offensive security skills toward OSCP.

Post-grad Red Team Operations (FIAP 2025), CRTA (CyberWarfare Labs 2026), OSCP in progress (OffSec), eJPTv2 (INE 2023). 2x National Champion at SAP CTF Brazil (2018, 2024).

Writing about red team operations, Active Directory attacks, cloud pentest, and C2 infrastructure.

HTB Flight machine avatar

HTB: Flight

Machine #73 on the Lain Kusanagi list. Flight earns its Hard rating not through any single clever trick, but through sheer chain length - each hop unlocks exactly one new thing, and you have to string six or seven of them together to reach SYSTEM. It’s a patience test as much as a technical one. Machine Info Name Flight Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Hard IP 10.129.7.136 Domain flight.htb TL;DR Nmap shows a full AD port set. Gobuster vhost finds school.flight.htb, a PHP app with a ?view= parameter vulnerable to LFI. UNC path inclusion leaks svc_apache’s NTLMv2 hash via Responder - john cracks it to S@Ss!K@*t13. Password spray finds S.Moon reuses the same password. S.Moon has WRITE on the Shared share - use ntlm_theft to drop a desktop.ini coercion file, Responder captures C.Bum’s hash, john cracks it to Tikkycoll_431012284. C.Bum has WRITE on the Web share - upload a PHP webshell, get a reverse shell as svc_apache. Generate a msfvenom payload, catch it in msfconsole, upload RunasCs via meterpreter, run as C.Bum to get a second session. Port-forward port 8000 (internal IIS dev site) through the C.Bum session, discover C:\inetpub\development is writable, upload an ASPX webshell, get a shell as IIS AppPool\DefaultAppPool. That account has SeImpersonatePrivilege - msfconsole getsystem uses Named Pipe Impersonation (EfsPotato variant) to land NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. ...

June 4, 2026 · 6 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Blackfield machine avatar

HTB: Blackfield

Machine #72 on the Lain Kusanagi list. Every step in this box is intentional - no guesswork, just clean AD attack chaining from zero creds to domain admin. One of the better Hard-rated machines for learning the full lifecycle. Machine Info Name Blackfield Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Hard IP 10.129.229.17 Domain BLACKFIELD.local TL;DR RID brute via null session gets a user list. ASREPRoast support, crack the hash, collect BloodHound data as support. BloodHound shows support can ForceChangePassword on audit2020. Change the password, enumerate SMB - forensic share has an lsass.zip in memory_analysis. pypykatz extracts svc_backup’s NT hash. PTH as svc_backup into WinRM - SeBackupPrivilege is enabled. Try SAM dump first (admin hash is stale). Use wbadmin to back up and restore ntds.dit, dump it with secretsdump, get the real admin hash, PTH to root. ...

June 3, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Sauna machine avatar

HTB: Sauna

Sauna is an Easy Windows box from HackTheBox built around a classic Active Directory attack chain. From open-source name enumeration to ASREPRoasting, autologon credential exposure, and a DCSync to finish it off - this one hits all the fundamentals. Machine Info Name Sauna Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Easy IP 10.129.95.180 TL;DR Scraped employee names off the bank’s “About” page, ran them through username-anarchy to generate AD-style usernames, and ASREPRoasted fsmith whose account had Kerberos pre-auth disabled. Cracked the hash with rockyou.txt and logged in via WinRM. Found autologon credentials for svc_loanmanager stored in plaintext in the registry. BloodHound showed that account has DCSync rights over the domain - used secretsdump to pull the Administrator hash and psexec to get SYSTEM. ...

June 3, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
Monteverde HTB machine cover image

HTB Monteverde - Azure AD Connect Password Extraction

Machine #48 on the Lain Kusanagi list. Active Directory, a forgotten config file, and the Azure AD Sync service doing what it really shouldn’t. Machine Info Field Details Name Monteverde Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Medium IP 10.129.228.111 Domain MEGABANK.LOCAL TL;DR Null session via nxc gives a full user list. A password spray with username=password lands SABatchJobs:SABatchJobs. Listing SMB shares reveals users$ is readable - spider_plus finds mhope/azure.xml, a leftover Azure AD Connect config file with a cleartext password. Spray again, get mhope via WinRM. mhope is in the Azure Admins group and the ADSync service is running locally. A public PoC decrypts the ADSync credentials from the local MSSQL database, handing us domain administrator. ...

June 1, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
HackTheBox Forest machine cover

HTB: Forest

Forest is one of those boxes that feels like a guided tour through Active Directory attack fundamentals. No CVEs, no fancy exploits - just proper AD enumeration, a misconfigured service account, and a BloodHound-mapped path straight to domain admin. Machine Info Field Details Name Forest Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Easy IP 10.129.5.64 TL;DR SMB user enumeration reveals a service account with no Kerberos pre-auth required. AS-REP roasting gives us a crackable hash. Shell as svc-alfresco via WinRM. BloodHound maps a path through Exchange groups giving WriteDacl on the domain. We abuse that to grant DCSync, dump the Administrator hash, and psexec our way to SYSTEM. ...

May 31, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
HackTheBox Giddy machine cover

HTB: Giddy

SQL injection doesn’t always mean dumping a database. Sometimes it just means coaxing the server into making a network connection it shouldn’t - and that’s enough to steal credentials. Giddy is a great example of that, paired with a creative privesc that requires bypassing Windows Defender with a custom payload. Machine Info Field Details Name Giddy Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Medium IP 10.129.96.140 TL;DR ASP.NET MVC app has a search endpoint vulnerable to SQL injection. We use xp_dirtree to force the SQL Server to authenticate outbound to our Responder instance, capturing Stacy’s NTLMv2 hash. After cracking it, Evil-WinRM gives us a shell. On the machine we find a unifivideo folder hinting at CVE-2016-6914 - Ubiquiti UniFi Video’s service hijacks taskkill.exe on stop. Defender blocks msfvenom, so we cross-compile a custom Go payload to add a local admin user and RDP in as root. ...

May 31, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Editorial machine cover

HTB: Editorial

Another medium box that starts with just a web form and ends with a root shell through a surprisingly elegant chain. Editorial is all about knowing what to look for — and what to ask the server to fetch for you. Machine Info Field Value Name Editorial Platform HackTheBox OS Linux Difficulty Medium IP 10.129.1.101 TL;DR SSRF on the book cover URL field → internal API on port 5000 → /api/latest/metadata/messages/authors leaks SSH creds for dev → git history in ~/apps reveals prod credentials → prod can run a GitPython clone script as root → ext:: protocol injection sets SUID on /bin/bash → root. ...

May 22, 2026 · 5 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Escape machine cover

HTB: Escape

Machine Info Field Value Name Escape Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Medium IP 10.129.228.253 TL;DR An unauthenticated SMB Public share exposes a PDF that contains SQL Server credentials. Connecting to MSSQL with those creds, we abuse xp_dirtree to capture the NTLMv2 hash of sql_svc via Responder and crack it with John. From there, SQL Server error logs left cleartext credentials for Ryan.Cooper lying around. As Ryan, certipy reveals an ESC1-vulnerable certificate template that allows anyone in Domain Users to request a cert on behalf of Administrator. One certificate later, we get the Administrator NT hash and land a SYSTEM shell via psexec. ...

May 22, 2026 · 4 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Certified machine avatar

HTB Certified - Active Directory Certificate Services and ESC9

Machine Information Field Details Name Certified Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Medium You start this box with valid low-privilege domain credentials: judith.mader / judith09. The path to Administrator is a chain of ACL abuses through Active Directory — no CVE, no exotic exploit, just misplaced permissions and the right tooling. TL;DR judith.mader has WriteOwner on the Management group. That lets us take ownership, grant ourselves FullControl via DACL edit, and add judith to the group. Management has GenericWrite on management_svc, so we use pywhisker to inject shadow credentials and retrieve the NTLM hash via PKINITtools. With management_svc on the box we find GenericAll on ca_operator in BloodHound, reset its password, then exploit ESC9 with certipy to forge an Administrator certificate. Final step: psexec as SYSTEM. ...

May 21, 2026 · 5 min · João Vítor Bonin
HTB Chatterbox machine avatar

HTB Chatterbox - AChat Buffer Overflow and Registry Credentials

Machine Information Field Details Name Chatterbox Platform HackTheBox OS Windows Difficulty Medium TL;DR AChat 0.150 beta7 is running on a non-standard port with a known buffer overflow. A public Python PoC gets us a shell as alfred after generating an x86 unicode-compatible reverse shell payload with msfvenom. Once in, the registry gives away autologon credentials (Alfred:Welcome1!) that also work for Administrator — straightforward credential reuse to SYSTEM. Recon 1 nmap -sC -sV -p- 10.129.1.92 Most of the ports are standard Windows noise — RPC, SMB. The interesting ones are 9255 and 9256, both identified as AChat. That’s a Windows chat application that barely anyone runs outside of CTFs, which is a big hint there’s something exploitable there. ...

May 21, 2026 · 3 min · João Vítor Bonin